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HOW TO RELEASE FREGE’S SYSTEM FROM RUSSELL’S
ANTINOMY
PAOLA CATTABRIGA
Abstract. The conditions for proper definitions in mathematics are given, in
terms of the theory of definition, on the basis of the criterions of eliminability
and non-creativity. As a definition, Russell’s antinomy is a violation of the
criterion of eliminability (Behmann, 1931, [1]; Bochvar, 1943, [2]). Following
the path of the criterion of non-creativity, this paper develops a new analysis of
Comprehension schema and, as a consequence, proof that Russell’s antinomy
argumentation, despite the words of Frege himself, does not hold in Grundge-
setze der Arithmetik. According to Basic Law (III), the class of classes not
belonging to themselves is a class defined by a function which can not take as
argument its own course of value,„
∀ = ε`
“
g
⌣
`
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
´”«
,
in other words, the class of classes not belonging to themselves is a class whose
classes are not identical to the class itself [6].
Introduction
Recently, a considerable attention has been devoted to the discovery of new
ways for repairing Frege’s system from the damage produced by Russell’s antinomy.
All these attempts share a common aptitude in finding new restrictive forms or
applications of the comprehension principle [4, 16, 20, 22, 25], either offer a revised
interpretation of Basic Law (V) [3].
The present note proposes a completely new way to restore Frege’s system, nei-
ther restrictive nor revising, rising from the logical inquiry in the theory of defini-
tion and the author’s investigations in self-reference procedures [7, 9]. Partially in
agreement with their constructive attitude, the result we are concerned with draws
its first inspiration from Jules-Henri Poincare´’s writings about the significance and
riskiness of impredicative definitions in mathematics.
The fact is that such a procedure is not applicable. Why? Because
their definitions are not predicative and contain within such a vi-
cious circle I already mentioned above; not predicative definitions
can not be substituted to defined terms. In this condition, logistics
is no longer sterile: it generates contradictions. (1902, [21], 211,
our translation)
With these words Poincare´ was directly referring to Cantor’s famous diagonaliza-
tion argument for reaching more-than-denumerable sets, criticizing the underlying
belief of the existence of the actual infinite. Russell’s antinomy and Cantor’s diag-
onalization are both self-referring procedures, and by admission of Russell himself
his discovery is due to his reflections about Cantor’s argument.
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I was led to the contradiction in the following way. As you, of course
know, Cantor proved that there is no greatest number. [. . . ] Now
there are concepts whose extension comprises everything; these
should therefore have the greatest number. I tried to set up a
one-one relation between all objects and all classes; when I ap-
plied Cantor’s proof with my special relation, I found that the class
Cls∩x  (x ∼ ǫx) was left over, even though all classes had already
been enumerated. I have already been thinking about this contra-
diction for a year; I believe the only solution is that function and
argument must be able to vary independently. ([14], 215, XXXV/3
Russell to Frege 24.6.1902)
Cantor’s diagonalization and Russell’s antinomy are logically connected, and for
the historical perspective the latter rises from the former. We shall expose how
the logical inquiry regarding the mathematical definitions and the rules for apply-
ing substitutions, as intuited by Poincare´, leads to the restore of Frege’s system.
Nowadays Russell’s antinomy is widespread in many several forms throughout logic
and mathematics, we shall apply our argument to three different theories. First, in
section 1, to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF ) [10], and to a first order set theory
close to Frege’s system ([15] 76-90), and finally in section 2, directly to Frege’s
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [12]. For this last section the redear is required to be
familiar with the original notation of Grundgesetze. This paper is the revised and
extended version of [8].
1. ZERMELO-FRAENKEL SET THEORY
In Cantor’s naive set theory a set was thought to be an aggregate, i.e a “collection
of elements into a whole of our intuition”. This conception appears accordingly
symbolized by the principle of comprehension, which can be regarded as a schema
originally conceived for defining sets. For this special function, we are legitimate
in considering the comprehension principle under the point of view of the theory of
definition1. On that basis the rules for definitions, established by the criterions of
eliminability and non-creativity, state the conditions for proper equivalence, giving
some basic restrictions to prevent superimpositions and circularity ([24], 151-173).
The rule for defining a new operation symbol (or a new individual constant, i.e. an
operation symbol of rank zero) is as follows:
1We are referring here to the field of logical researches of ancient tradition, which in the
last century has seen noteworthy contributions from A. Padoa, J.C.C. Mckinsey, A. Tarsky, E.
W. Beth, A. Robinson, W. Craig. It is also worth mentioning how significative the theory of
definition was throughout Frege’s whole foundation of mathematics [13, 11, 12], even if it was
unfortunately neglected, as we will see, in the famous rushed appendix ([12], II 253-265). The
principle of Comprehension results to be formalized for the first time in Grundgesetze,
⊢ f(a) = a a ε`f(ε),
but its role in defining new objects seems not to be sufficiently focussed by Frege ([12], I 73, 75,
117). All that appears to be comprehensible for that time, as the modern theory of definition
was at its beginning exactly with Frege and Peano. Remained in the twilight for years, the first
notable result investigating the meaning of the introduction of new symbols for the interplay
between mathematical definition and logical deduction, could be viewed as an outcome of the
questions raised in Frege–Peano correspondence [19].
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r1 An equivalence E introducing a new n-place operation symbol O is a proper
definition in a theory if, and only if, E is of the form
O(x1 . . . xn) = y ↔ ψ,
and the following restrictions are satisfied: (i) x1 . . . xn, y are distinct vari-
ables, (ii) ψ has no free variables other than x1 . . . xn, y, (iii) ψ is a formula
in which the only non-logical constants are primitive symbols and previously
defined symbols of the theory, and (iv) the formula ∃!yψ is derivable from
the axioms and preceding definitions of the theory.
With condition (iv) we are required to have a preceding theorem which guaran-
tees that the operation is uniquely defined. If the restriction on the uniqueness is
dropped then a contradiction can be derived ([24], 159). The self-referring char-
acteristic of Russell’s antinomy will turn out to be a procedure which forces a set
to be twice defined, we are dealing with a set whose elements belong and do not
belong to the set itself, dropping thus the above uniqueness condition.
As it is well-known, in ZF when defining a set, the uniqueness for the compre-
hension axiom schema is ensured by the axiom of extensionality. Let us introduce
to them both,
Comprehension ∀z1...∀zn∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ϕ(x)),(C)
where ϕ(x) is any formula in ZF, z1, ..., zn are the free variables of ϕ(x) other than
x, and y is not a free variable of ϕ(x),
Extensionality ∀x∀y[∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)↔ x = y].(E1)
Extensionality, without any additional axioms, implies that for every condition ϕ(x)
on x (in Comprehension) there exists “at most” one set y which contains exactly
those elements x which fulfil the condition ϕ(x). In other words, if there is a set y
such that ∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ϕ(x)), y is unique. It can be shown as follows. If y′ is also
such, i.e. ∀x(x ∈ y′ ↔ ϕ(x)), then we have, obviously ∀x(x ∈ y′ ↔ x ∈ y), and
then by Extensionality, y′ = y. ([10] 31, [18] 7, [5] 67).
Usually Russell’s antinomy argumentation is presented as follows.
RA There exists no set which contains exactly those elements which do not
contain themselves, in symbols ¬∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x).
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that y is a set such that for every element
x, x ∈ y if and only if x /∈ x. For x = y, we have y ∈ y if and only if y /∈ y.
Since, obviously, y ∈ y or y /∈ y, and as we saw, each of y ∈ y and y /∈ y
implies the other statement, we have both y ∈ y and y /∈ y, which is a
contradiction ([10], 31).
This proof holds for sure as a first order theorem, as indeed in first order logic
⊢ ¬∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x),
and it can affect comprehension principle when it is regarded individually or in
itself
(C)→ ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x) ⊢ ,
but it does not hold in any system which applies both Comprehension and Exten-
sionality
(C) ∪ (E1) ⊢ ¬∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x).
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Indeed we can show that Russell’s antinomy does not affect a first order set theory,
since by Extensionality the above proof RA can not be accomplished. If as an
example of Comprehension we define
x ∈ y if and only if x /∈ x
then by Extensionality we obtain always (detailed proof in the following of this
section and in section 2)
(∗) (x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x)→ ¬(x = y),
so it is never the case that x = y. This is an applicative case of the uniqueness
condition. Indeed a special case because it involves negation and therefore comple-
mentation. For it, the above inference RA can not be accomplished since “x = y”
can not be assumed and “y ∈ y if and only if y /∈ y” is not derived. In other terms,
for a simple first order rule from
∀x(x ∈ a↔ x /∈ x)
we can yield
(a ∈ a↔ a /∈ a),
but this rule is not applicable during a reasoning of set theory where, by Exten-
sionality, the formula
(∗∗) (x ∈ a↔ x /∈ x)→ ¬(x = a)
can always be derived.
Two sets are equal when and only when they have the same elements, and the
equality between sets must fulfill all the requirements of the relation of identity,
namely, reflexivity, every set has the same elements as itself, and substitutivity of
identity, x = y → (P (x)↔ P (y)) (for x and y any set and P any property). Actu-
ally the substitutivity of identity is a version of the Principle of the Indiscernibility
of Identicals, one of the consequences of Frege’s Basic Law (III) (see section 2).
In set theory it doesn’t follow directly from the relation of coexstensiveness, and,
whether axiom or hypothesis, a principle must be stated that two coextensive sets
share all their properties and are therefore equal. The principle of extensionality
says in effect that two sets are identical if and only if they have the same elements,
in symbols (E1). Let us recall also a further first order schema as follows,
Extensionality ∀x∀y[x = y → (φ(x, x)↔ φ(x, y))],(E2)
where φ(x, y) is obtained from φ(x, x) by replacing y for zero, one or more occur-
rences of x in the wff φ(x, x), and y is free for x in all occurrences of x which it
replaces ([15] 79). Under the logical point of view (E2) is, as respect to (E1), the
integral schema, quite close to Frege’s Basic Law (III). (E2) yields
∀x∀y[x = y → ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)]
([15] 139), which holds usually in ZF together with the further statement
∀x∀y[∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y],
either as axiom ([10] 27), or theorem ([15] 141). Any derivation of (∗) in ZF
requires necessarily both statements, so that we adopted directly (E1) ([17] 109).
As in Frege’s Grundgesetze, see section (2), (∗) follows easily from (E2), whereas
the derivation of (∗) from (E1) is bound to the methodological concerns of ZF. We
shall expose both the cases.
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Let us begin with the first,
(I) x = y → (x ∈ x↔ x ∈ y)
is an instance of (E2) where φ(x, x) is x ∈ x and φ(x, y) is x ∈ y, so that x ∈ y
is obtained by substituting x with y in x ∈ x. We notice that the restriction on y
in (E2) is fulfilled so that (I) follows logically from (E2). (I) yields by (p → q) ↔
(¬q → ¬p)and (p ↔ q) ↔ (q ↔ p)
(II) ¬(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ x)→ ¬(x = y)
and then,¬(p ↔ q) ↔ (p ↔ ¬q),
(III) (x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x)→ ¬(x = y),
i.e. (∗) QED.
In ZF (∗) can be derived easily from (E1) too, with the exception of the method-
ological limitations about illegitimate self-referring.
In most cases when we use variables as metamathematical variables
for variables we shall assume, tacitly, that different variables stand
for different variables. E.g. the set of all statements ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈
y) is also assumed to contain the statement ∀u(u ∈ w ↔ u ∈ v), but
not to contain the statement ∀x(x ∈ x ↔ x ∈ y). In some other
cases we do not insist that different variables stand for different
variables. ([10] 21)
As well-known set theorists use methodically such tacit assumptions in ZF with the
purpose of preventing self-contradictory procedures from arising. But our aim is
actually just to show that Russell’s antinomy does not follow when Extensionality
is taken suitably into account. We shall place therefore the above tacit assumptions
in stand by, and we shall keep in enquiring instead into the restrictions established
by the theory of definition.
Furthermore, let us add, that if we allow expressions of totalities and self-
reference in Comprehension schema there is no reason to prevent the same ex-
pressions within Extensionality schema.
Accordingly, in ZF
(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ x)↔ x = y,
is an instance of (E1), hence
¬(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ x)→ ¬(x = y),
and finally
(x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x)→ ¬(x = y),
i.e. (∗), QED. Whenever (C) yields ∀x(x ∈ a↔ x /∈ x) by (∗) we have (∗∗) too.
We can now state that Russell’s antinomy argumentation does not hold in a
first order system based on Comprehension and Extensionality, because it violates
the restriction on the uniqueness established by extensionality. In defining a set
containing exactly those elements which do not contain themselves we define a set
which members can not be considered to be identical to the set itself, either we
should have a set defined twice, as a set which contains and does not contain itself.
This would be to define a set and its complement as being exactly the same iden-
tical set, and in detail to violate the criterion of non-creativity and its consequent
criterion of relative consistency ([24], 155). From the logical point of view Russell’s
antinomy turns out to be just a partial argument. Although set theory disposes of
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the symbols to mention, or to express, the existence of sets containing exactly those
elements which do not contain themselves, yet, when the argument reaches its own
whole representation, no contradiction can be derived. All that turns out to be
amazing especially in Frege’s Grundgesetze, since the subcomponent “ (∀ = ∀)”,
which prevent the contradiction in Frege’s way out ([12], II 262-263), can be de-
rived simply by Basic Law (III), namely without Frege’s restrictions. The so called
“Frege’s way out” is in the relative literature the shortening for the original Frege’s
attempt to repair his system, by means of (V’b) and (V’c). As well-known the
amended axiom blocks the derivation of Russell’s antinomy, but it is not formally
satisfactory ([23] 165-170). On the contrary the solution we propose here seems to
be formally faultless.
2. FREGE SYSTEM
We are now ready to reconsider the appendix of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
([12], II 253-265) in accordance with what was previously stated. We shall prove
that despite the words of Frege himself Russell’s antinomy can not be derived.
In the following, Frege’s symbolism is fully adopted, except for the modern sym-
bol of implication. First let us look at the deduction involved with function ζ a ξ.
... Now let us see how the matter turns out if we make use of our
sign “a”. Here “ε`( ε a ε)” will occur in place of “∀”. If in our
proposition
(82) F (a a ε`f(ε)) → F (f(a))
we take
“ ξ a ξ” for “f(ξ)”,i)
“ ξ” for “F (ξ)”,ii)
and “ε`( ε a ε)” for “a”,iii)
then we obtain
(θ) ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε)→
ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε),
from which by (Ig) there follows
(ι) ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε).
Making the same substitutions in proposition
(77) F (f(a)) → F (a a ε`f(ε))
we obtain
(κ) ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε)→
ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε),
from which together with (ι) there follows
(λ) ε`( ε a ε) a ε`( ε a ε),
which contradicts (ι). Therefore at least one of the two (77) and
(82) must be false, and therefore proposition
(1) ⊢ f(a) = a a ε`f(ε),
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also, from which they both follow. A look at the derivation of (1)
in §55 of our first volume shows that there too use is made of (Vb).
Thus suspicion is directed at this proposition here as well. ([12],
II 257)
Within Frege’s system the proposition
⊢ a = b → (g(a) = g(b))
(IIIh, [12], I 66-67) can be achieved by basic law
(III) ⊢ f(a = b)→ f(
g
⌣ (g(b)→ g(a))),
as well as the proposition ( g(a) = g(b)) → (a = b).
In detail from
g(a) → (g(b) → (a = b))
(IIIb, ibid. 66-67), and g(ξ) = ( g(a) = g(ξ)) we obtain
g(a) = g(a) → (( g(a) = g(b)) → (a = b)),
and
g(a) = g(a) → (( g(a) = g(b)) → (a = b)),
so that, by ⊢ a = a (IIIe, ibid. 66-67),
(2) ( g(a) = g(b)) → (a = b).
Let us now reconsider in accordance the above Frege’s substitutions in (82) and
(77). Firstly, by the substitution i) in law (1) we obtain
(3) a a a = a a ε`( ε a ε).
Then replacing
“a a ξ” for “g(ξ)”,iv)
and “ε`( ε a ε)” for “b”,v)
in (2) we obtain
(4) ( a a a = a a ε`( ε a ε)) → (a = ε`( ε a ε)).
Therefore by (3) and (4)
(5) (a = ε`( ε a ε)).
Now the replacement of “ε`( ε a ε)” for “a” in (3) turns out to be invalid, and
consequently Frege’s substitution iii) in (82) and (77) can not be accomplished.
Therefore (θ), (ι), (κ), (λ) and the contradiction can no longer be derived2, QED.
Our proof shows that Frege’s way out of negating for any function the possibility
to take as argument its own course of value ([12], II 262), as in
(V’b) ⊢ (ε`f(ε) = α`g(α))→ ( (a = ε`f(ε))→ f(a) = g(a))
and
(V’c) ⊢ (ε`f(ε) = α`g(α))→ ( (a = α`g(α))→ f(a) = g(a)),
turns out to be useless and too restrictive. Frege’s Basic Law (III) already rules out
the cases of those functions which would lead to contradiction taking as argument
its own course of value, without need to exclude all the other cases of self-referring.
2Compare with Frege’s amendment, (1′ ([12] 264-265)
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Indeed there can be cases of functions which argument can be its own course of
value without yielding any contradiction, so that there is no reason for excluding
them a priori. To clarify all that, let us recall Frege’s passage after the introduction
of (V’b) and (V’c).
Let us now convince ourselves that the contradiction that arose
earlier between the proposition (β) and (ǫ) is now avoided. We
proceed as we did in the derivation of (β), using (V’c) instead of
(Vb). As before, let
∗) “∀” abbreviate “ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
”.
By (V’c) we have
⊢ε`( f(ε)) = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
))
→( (
∀ = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
)))
→
( f(∀)) =
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀→ g(∀)
))
.
Using our abbreviation, we obtain
⊢ε`( f(ε)) = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
→(
(∀ = ∀)→
( f(∀)) =
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀→ g(∀)
))
,
which is obviously true, because of the subcomponent “ (∀ = ∀)”
and on that very account can never lead to a contradiction. ([12],
II 262-263, for (β and (ǫ see ibid. 256)
We show now that by basic laws (V) and (III) we can achieve immediately
(∀ = ∀)
and (
∀ = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
)))
without applying V’c.
By the definition of the identity sign ([12], I 11), the notation for the course of
value ([12], I 15) and ∗), the symbols “∀” and “ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
”
denote the same object, and, if from basic law
(V) ⊢ (ε`g(ε) = α`f(α)) = (
a
⌣ g(a) = f(a))
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we draw
(6)
(
ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
))
= ε`( f(ε))
)
=
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀→ g(∀)
)
= ( f(∀))
)
,
which means
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀ → g(∀)
)
= ( f(∀)) is true if and only if
“ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
” and “ε`( f(ε))” refer to the same object, then
consequently
(7)
(
ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
= ∀
)
=
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀ → g(∀)
)
= ( f(∀))
)
.
Now substituting
“
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ξ → g(ξ)
)
” for “f(ξ)”vi)
in (7) we obtain
(8)
(
ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
))
= ∀
)
=
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀ → g(∀) =
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀→ g(∀)
))
.
We replace then
“
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ξ → g(ξ)
)
” for “g(ξ)”,vii)
“∀” for “a”,viii)
“∀” for “b”ix)
in (2) yielding
(9)
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀ → g(∀)
)
=
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ∀ → g(∀)
))
→
(∀ = ∀).
Hence for ∗), (8) and (9)
(10) (∀ = ∀).
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Let us regard everything by means of a different substitution. By (V) we can
yield
(11)
(
ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
= ∀
)
=
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
))
→
g
(
ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε→ g(ε)
))))
= ( f(∀))
)
.
Then for vi) in (11), and vii), ix) and
“ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
))
” for “a”,x)
in (2) we achieve
(12)
(
∀ = ε`
(
g
⌣
(
ε`( g(ε)) = ε → g(ε)
)))
.
Accordingly, the above mentioned (β) and (ǫ) can not be drawn, without applying
(V’c) or (V’b), and no contradiction can be derived. We have thus proved that
that special self-reference procedure which is Russell’s antinomy does not damage
Frege’s system, QED.
Ending Notes. Following Frege’s way out, all subsequent literature states the
necessity to assert the comprehension schema in some restricted form such as
a ∈ ε`f(ε)↔ (a 6= ε`f(ε) ∧ f(a)),
(see for example [23], 168). On the bases of our enlightenment the uniqueness
established by extensionality turns out to be sufficient to prevent the inference of
Russell’s antinomy, preserving in addition the assumption of sound self-reference
procedures. As just shown we attain (10) and (12) as consequences of Basic Law
(III), which means that the class of classes not belonging to themselves is defined
by a function which can not take as argument its own course of value, i.e. it is a
class whose classes are not identical to the class itself.
It would be worthless mentioning all the well-known attempts to amend the
foundation of mathematics from the supposed damage to the principle of compre-
hension, like for example Russell’s theory of types, Quine’s New Foundation, von
Neumann-Bernays system of set theory, and so on. We conclude simply observing
that in our perspective the necessity of a restriction like Zermelo’s Aussonderung
([10], 36) appears to be doubtful. Why define a Axiom for ’separating’ or ’selecting’
those members which fulfil condition ϕ(x), in Comprehension, if by Extensionality
∃!y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ϕ(x))?
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